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ABSTRACT
A blockchain is a database of sequential events that is maintained by
a distributed group of nodes. A key consensus problem in blockchains
is that of determining the next block (data element) in the sequence.
Many blockchains address this by electing a new node to propose
each new block. The new block is (typically) appended to the tip
of the proposer’s local blockchain, and subsequently broadcast to
the rest of the network. Without network delay (or adversarial
behavior), this procedure would give a perfect chain, since each
proposer would have the same view of the blockchain. A major
challenge in practice is forking. Due to network delays, a proposer
may not yet have the most recent block, and may therefore cre-
ate a side chain that branches from the middle of the main chain.
Forking reduces throughput, since only one a single main chain
can survive, and all other blocks are discarded. We propose a new
P2P protocol for blockchains called Barracuda, in which each pro-
poser, prior to proposing a block, polls ℓ other nodes for their local
blocktree information. Under a stochastic network model, we prove
that this lightweight primitive improves throughput as if the entire
network were a factor of ℓ faster. We provide guidelines on how to
implement Barracuda in practice, guaranteeing robustness against
several real-world factors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Mathematics of computing → Probabilistic algorithms; •
Networks→ Peer-to-peer protocols; •Computer systems or-
ganization→ Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchains are a sequential data structure in which each element
depends in a structured, predefined manner on every prior element.
Most blockchains implement this property recursively by including
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in each data element a hash of the previous element. This makes it
easy to append an element to the end of a blockchain, but difficult
to alter or insert elements in the middle of a blockchain, since
every subsequent element must be modified to preserve validity. In
parallel, the word ‘blockchain’ has also come to mean the network
and consensus algorithms that enable a distributed set of nodes to
maintain such a data structure robustly and consistently.
In practice, there are many obstacles to maintaining a distributed
blockchain, including peer churn, adversarial behavior, and unreli-
able networks. In this paper, we focus on the latter challenge and
consider how to build efficient blockchains over unreliable net-
works. Although the research community is increasingly studying
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks in blockchain systems [3, 4, 8, 16, 23],
network effects are arguably the aspect of blockchains that have
received the least attention thus far. In particular, we are interested
in how the network affects blockchain performance metrics like
latency and throughput for new data elements. To explain the prob-
lem, we start with a brief description of blockchain functionality.
Blockchain Primer. Blockchain systems are typically used to
track sequential events, such as financial transactions in a cryp-
tocurrency. A block is simply a data structure that stores a batch of
such events, along with a hash of the previous block contents. The
core problem in blockchain systems is determining (and agreeing
on) the next block in the data structure. Many leading cryptocur-
rencies (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Cardano, EOS, Monero) handle this
problem by electing a proposer who is responsible for producing
a new block and sharing it with the network. This proposer elec-
tion happens via a distributed, randomized protocol chosen by the
system designers.
In Bitcoin, proposers are selected with probability proportional
to the computational energy they have expended; this mechanism
is called proof-of-work (PoW). Under PoW, each node solves a
computational puzzle of random duration; upon solving the puzzle,
the node relays its block over the underlying P2P network, along
with proof that it solved the puzzle. Due to the high energy cost
of solving PoW puzzles (or mining) [19], a new paradigm recently
emerged called proof-of-stake (PoS). Under PoS, a proposer is elected
with probability proportional to their stake in the system. This
election process happens at fixed time intervals.
When a node is elected proposer, its job is to propose a new block,
which contains a hash of the previous block’s contents. Hence the
proposer must choose where in the blockchain to append her new
block. Most blockchains use a longest chain fork choice rule, under
which the proposer always appends her new block to the end of the
longest chain of blocks in the proposer’s local view of the blocktree.
If there is no network latency and no adversarial behavior, this rule
ensures that the blockchain will always be a perfect chain. However,
in a network with random delays, it is possible that the proposer
may not have received all blocks when she is elected. As such, she
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
08
71
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 S
ep
 20
19
Mobihoc ’19, July 2–5, 2019, Catania, Italy
might propose a block that causes the blockchain to fork (e.g. Figure
2). In longest-chain blockchains, this forking is eventually resolved
with probability 1 because one fork eventually overtakes the other.
Forking occurs in almost all major blockchains, and it implies
that blockchains are often not chains at all, but blocktrees. For many
consensus protocols (particularly chain-based ones like Bitcoin’s),
forking reduces throughput, because blocks that are not on the
main chain are discarded. It also has security implications; even
protocols that achieve good block throughput in the high-forking
regime have thus far been prone to security vulnerabilities (which
has been resolved in a recent work [2], which also guarantees low
latency). Nonetheless, forking is a significant obstacle to practical
performance in existing blockchains. There are two common ap-
proaches to mitigate forking. One is to improve the network itself,
e.g. by upgrading hardware and routing. This idea has been the
basis for recent projects like the Falcon network [3] and Bloxroute.
The other is to design consensus algorithms that tolerate network la-
tency by making use of forked branches. Examples include GHOST
[31], SPECTRE [29], and Inclusive/Conflux [20, 21]. In this paper,
we design a P2P protocol called Barracuda that effectively reduces
forking for a wide class of existing consensus algorithms.
Contributions.We propose a novel probabilistic framework that
allows one to formally investigate the trade-off between the net-
work delays and the throughput. We propose a new block proposal
protocol to mitigate the forking due to those network delays. We
prove that when the proposer node polls ℓ randomly selected nodes
for their local blocktree information, then it has the same effect
as speeding up the communication network by a factor of ℓ, thus
reducing forking significantly. This is stated informally in the fol-
lowing and precisely in Theorem 4.
Theorem 1 (Informal). In a fully connected network with ex-
ponential network delays of mean ∆, let L∆(t) denote the (random)
number of blocks included in the longest chain at time t . For suffi-
ciently small ℓ, under the proposed ℓ-Barracuda polling, the resulting
height of the longest chain is close to L∆/ℓ(t) for any arbitrary block
arrival process and any local attachment protocol.
These results hold without actually changing any network hard-
ware, and they apply generally to any block arrival process or fork
choice rule. In fact, we prove a significantly stronger statement;
the entire blocktree probability mass function changes to as if the
network is faster by a factor of ℓ, not just the downstream statistic
of longest chain length. The analysis also has connections to load
balancing in balls-and-bins problems, which may be of independent
interest. We make the following three specific contributions:
(1) We propose a new probabilistic model for the evolution of
a blockchain in proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies, where the
main source of randomness comes from the network delay.
This captures the network delays measured in real world P2P
cryptocurrency networks [8]. Simulations under this model
explain the gap observed in real-world cryptocurrencies,
between the achievable block throughput and the best block
throughput possible in an infinite-capacity network. Our
model differs from that of prior theoretical papers, which
typically assume a worst-case network model that allows
significant simplification in the analysis [13, 31]. We analyze
the effect of average network delay on system throughput
and provide a lower bound on the block throughput.
(2) To mitigate forking due to network delays, we propose a new
block proposal algorithm called ℓ-Barracuda, under which
nodes poll ℓ randomly-selected nodes for their local blocktree
information before proposing a new block. We show that
for small values of ℓ, Barracuda has approximately the same
effect as if the entire network were a factor of ℓ faster.
(3) We provide guidelines on how to implement Barracuda in
practice in order to provide robustness against several real-
world factors, such as network model mismatch and adver-
sarial behavior.
Outline. We begin by describing a stochastic model for blocktree
evolution in Section 2; we analyze the block throughput of this
model in Section 3. Next, we present Barracuda and analyze its
block throughput in Section 4. Finally, we describe real-world im-
plementation issues in Section 5, such as how to implement polling
and analyzing adversarial robustness.
2 MODEL
We propose a probabilistic model for blocktree evolution with two
sources of randomness: randomness in the timing and the proposer
of each new block, and the randomness in the delay in transmitting
messages over the network. The whole system is parametrized
by the number of nodes n, average network propagation delay ∆,
proposer waiting time ∆˜, and number of concurrent proposers k .
2.1 Modeling block generation
Wemodel block generation as a discrete-time arrival process, where
the t th block is generated at time γ (t). We previously discussed the
election of a single proposer for each block; in practice, some sys-
tems elect multiple proposers at once to provide robustness if one
proposer fails or is adversarial. Hence at time γ (t), k nodes are
chosen uniformly at random as proposers, each of which proposes
a distinct block. The index t ∈ Z+ is a positive integer, which we
also refer to as time when it is clear from the context whether we
are referring to t or γ (t). The randomness in choosing the pro-
posers is independent across time and of other sources of random-
ness in the model. We denote the k blocks proposed at time t as
(t , 1), (t , 2), . . . , (t ,k). The block arrival process follows the distri-
bution of a certain point process, which is independent of all other
randomness in the model.
Two common block arrival process are Poisson and deterministic.
Under a Poisson arrival process, γ (t) − γ (t − 1) ∼ Exp(λ) for some
constant λ, andγ (t)−γ (t−1) is independent of {γ (i)}t−1i=1 . In proof-of-
work (PoW) systems like Bitcoin, block arrivals are determined by
independent attempts at solving a cryptographic puzzle, where each
attempt has a fixed probability of success. With high probability,
one proposer is elected each time a block arrival occurs (i.e., k = 1),
and the arrival time can be modeled as a Poisson arrival process.
In many PoS protocols (e.g., Cardano, Qtum, and Particl), time is
split into quantized intervals. Some protocols give each user a fixed
probability of being chosen to propose the next block in each time
interval, leading to a geometrically-distributed block arrival time. If
the probability of selecting any proposer in each time slot is smaller
than one, the expected inter-block arrival time will be greater than
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one, as in Qtum and Particl. Other protocols explicitly designate one
proposer per time slot (e.g., Cardano [6]). Assuming all nodes are
active, such protocols can be modeled with a deterministic interval
process,γ (t) = t , for all t ∈ N. The deterministic arrival processmay
even be a reasonable approximation for certain parameter regimes
of protocols like Qtum and Particl. If the probability of electing
any proposer in a time step is close to one, there will be at least
one block proposer in each time slot with high probability, which
can be approximated by a deterministic arrival process. Regardless,
our main results apply to arbitrary arrival processes γ (t), including
geometric and deterministic.
When a block (t , i) is generated by a proposer, the proposer at-
taches the new block to one of the existing blocks, which we refer to
as the parent block of (t , i). The proposer chooses this parent block
according to a pre-determined rule called a fork-choice rule; we dis-
cuss this further in Section 2.1. Upon creating a block, the proposer
broadcasts a message containing the following information:
Mt,i = (Block (t , i), pointer to the parent block of (t , i))
to all the other nodes in the system. The broadcasting process is
governed by our network model, which is described in Section 2.1.
In this work, we focus mainly on the PoS setting due to subtleties
in the practical implementation of Barracuda (described in Sec-
tion 4). In particular, PoW blockchains require candidate proposers
to choose a block’s contents—including the parent block—before
generating the block. But in PoW, block generation itself takes an
exponentially-distributed amount of time. Hence, if a proposer were
to poll nodes before proposing, that polling information would al-
ready be (somewhat) stale by the time the block gets broadcast to
the network. In contrast, PoS cryptocurrencies allow block creation
to happen after a proposer is elected; hence polling results can
be simultaneously incorporated into a block and broadcast to the
network. Because of this difference, PoS cryptocurrencies benefit
more from Barracuda than PoW ones.
Global view of the blocktree. Notice that the collection of all
messages forms a rooted tree, called the blocktree. Each node rep-
resents a block, and each directed edge represents a pointer to a
parent block. The root is called the genesis block, and is visible to
all nodes. All blocks generated at time t = 1 point to the genesis
block as a parent. The blocktree grows with each new block, since
the block’s parent must be an existing block in the blocktree; since
each block can specify only one parent, the data structure remains
a tree. Formally, we define the global blocktree as follows.
Definition 1 (Global tree). We define the global tree at time t ,
denoted asGt , to be a graph whose edges are described by the set
{(Block (j, i), pointer to the parent block of (j, i)) : 1 ≤ j ≤ t , 1 ≤
i ≤ k} with the vertices being the union of the genesis block and
all the blocks indexed as {(j, i) : 1 ≤ j ≤ t , 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
If there is no network delay in communicating the messages,
then all nodes will have the same view of the blocktree. However,
due to network delays and the distributed nature of the system, a
proposer might add a block before receiving all the previous blocks.
Hence, the choice of the parent node depends on the local view of
the blocktree at the proposer node.
Local view of the blocktree. Each node has its own local view of
the blocktree, depending on which messages it has received. Upon
receiving the messageMt,i , a node updates its local view as follows.
If the local view contains the parent block referred in the message,
then the block t is attached to it. If the local view does not contain
the parent block, then the message is stored in an orphan cache
until the parent block is received. Notice that Gt is random and
each node’s local view is a subgraph of Gt .
2.2 Network model and fork choice rule
We avoid modeling the topology of the underlying communication
network by instead modeling the (stochastic) end-to-end delay of
a message from any source to any destination node. Stochastic
network models have been studied for measuring the effects of self-
ish mining [15] and blockchain throughput [25]. We assume each
block reaches a given node with delay distributed as an indepen-
dent exponential random variable with mean ∆. This exponential
delay captures the varying and dynamic network effects of real
blockchain networks, as empirically measured in [8] on Bitcoin’s
P2P network. In particular, this exponential delay encompasses both
network propagation delay and processing delays caused by nodes
checking message validity prior to relaying it. These checks are
often used to protect against denial-of-service attacks, for instance.
When a proposer is elected to generate a new block at time γ (t),
she waits time ∆˜ ∈ [0, 1) and decides on where to append the new
block in its local blocktree. The choice of parent block is governed
by the fork choice rule. The most common one is the Nakamoto
protocol (longest chain), though other fork choice rules do exist.
When a node is elected as a proposer under the Nakamoto protocol
(or longest chain rule), the node attaches the block to the leaf of the
longest chain in the local blocktree. When there is a tie, the proposer
chooses one arbitrarily. Longest chain is widely-used, including in
Bitcoin, ZCash, and Monero. The Nakamoto protocol belongs to the
family of local attachment protocols, where the proposer makes the
decision on where to attach the block solely based on the snapshot
of its local tree at time γ (t) + ∆˜, stripping away the information
on the proposer of each block. In other words, we require that the
protocol be invariant to the identity of the proposers of the newly
generated block. We show in Section 4 that our analysis applies
generally to all local attachment protocols. In practice, almost all
blockchains use local attachment protocols.
Notice that if ∆ is much smaller than the block inter-arrival time
and all nodes obey protocol, then the global blocktree Gt is more
likely to form a chain. On the other hand, if ∆ is much larger than
the block inter-arrival time, thenGt is more likely to be a star (i.e. a
depth-one rooted tree). To maximize blockchain throughput, it is
desirable to design protocols that maximize the expected length
of the longest chain of Gt . Intuitively, a faster network infrastruc-
ture with a smaller ∆ implies less forking. In this work, we are
interested primarily in settings where ∆ is larger than the mean
inter-block time. This is admittedly not a conventional setting for
existing blockchain systems, but a current trend in next-generation
blockchains is to minimize block times and/or to run blockchains
on increasingly unreliable networks (e.g., ad hoc networks, wireless
networks, etc.). In both settings, we may expect ∆ to be comparable
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to or larger than the block time. Hence our paper aims in part to
understand the feasibility of operating blockchains in this regime.
3 BLOCK THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS
A key performance metric in blockchains is transaction throughput,
or the number of transactions that can be processed per unit time.
Transaction throughput is closely related to a property called block
throughput, also known as the main chain growth rate. Given a
blocktree Gt , the length of the main chain L(Gt ) is defined as the
number of hops from the genesis block to the farthest leaf. Precisely,
L(Gt ) ≜ max
B∈∂(Gt )
d(B0,B),
where ∂(Gt ) denotes the set of leaf blocks in Gt , and d(B0,B) de-
notes the hop distance between two vertices B0 and B inGt . We de-
fine block throughput as limt→∞ E[L(Gt )]/t . Block throughput de-
scribes how quickly blocks are added to the blockchain; if each block
is full and contains only valid transactions, then block throughput
is proportional to transaction throughput. In practice, this is not
the case, since adversarial strategies like selfish mining [10] can be
used to reduce the number of valid transactions per block. Regard-
less, block throughput is frequently used as a stepping stone for
quantifying transaction throughput [2, 13, 31].
For this reason, a key objective of our work is to quantify block
throughput, both with and without polling. We begin by studying
block throughput without polling under the Nakamoto protocol
fork-choice rule, as in Bitcoin. This has been previously studied in
[2, 13, 31], under a simple network model where there is a fixed
deterministic delay between any pair of nodes. This simple network
model is justified by arguing that if all transmission of messages
are guaranteed to arrive within a fixed maximum delay d , then the
worst case of block throughput happens when all transmission have
delay of exactly d . Such practice ignores all the network effects, for
the sake of tractable analysis. In this section, we focus on capturing
such network effect on the block throughput. We ask the funda-
mental question of how block throughput depends on the average
network delay, under a more realistic network model where each
communication is a realization of a random exponential variable
with average delay ∆. In the following (Theorem 2), we provide
a lower bound on the block throughput, under the more nuanced
network model from Section 2, and Nakamoto protocol fork-choice
rule. This result holds for a deterministic arrival process. We refer
to a longer version of this paper [11] for a proof.
Theorem 2. Suppose there is a single proposer (k = 1) at each
discrete time, γ (t) = t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, with no waiting time (∆˜ = 0).
For any number of nodes n, any time t , any average delay ∆, and
C∆ = e
−1
∆ , under the Nakamoto protocol, we have that
E[LChain(Gt )]
t
≥ exp
( −C∆
(1 −C∆)2
)
.
Notice that trivially, E[LChain(Gt )]/t ≤ 1, with equality when
there is no network delay, ∆ = 0. Theorem 3 and our experiments in
Figure 1 suggest that Theorem 2 is tight when ∆ ≪ 1. Hence there
is an (often substantial) gap between the realized block throughput
and the desired upper bound. This gap is caused by network delays;
since proposers may not have an up-to-date view of the blocktree
due to network latency, they may append to blocks that are not
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Figure 1: Block throughput vs. average network delay for an
inter-block time of 1 time unit.
necessarily at the end of the global main chain, thereby causing the
blockchain to fork.
One goal is to obtain a blocktree with no forking at all, i.e., a per-
fect blockchainwithLChain(Gt ) = t . Setting exp
(−C∆/(1 −C∆)2) =
1 − 1/t , which implies that E[LChain(Gt )] ≥ t − 1, we obtain that
∆ = Θ( 1log t ). The following result shows that if ∆ = O( 1log t ), then
LChain(Gt ) = t with high probability.
Theorem 3. Fix a confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1),k = 1,γ (t) = t .
For the Nakamoto protocol, if
1
∆
≥
(
ln t − ln ln 1δ
)
1 − ∆˜ , (1)
then the chain Gen− 1− 2− . . . − t happens with probability at least
δ − o(1) as t →∞ and n ≫ t2.
Conversely, when n ≫ (∆t ln t)2 and
1
∆
≤
(
ln t − ln ln 1δ
)
1 − ∆˜ , (2)
then the chain Gen− 1− 2− . . . − t happens with probability at most
δ + o(1) as t →∞. Here≫ ignores the dependence on the parameter
δ , which is fixed throughout.
The proof is included in Section 6.1. This result shows the preva-
lence of forking. For example, if we conservatively use Bitcoin’s
parameters settings, taking ∆ = 0.017, ∆˜ = 0, and δ = 0.01, equa-
tion (2) implies that for t ≳ 5 blocks, forking occurs with high
probability. Hence forking is pervasive even in systems with pa-
rameters chosen specifically to avoid it.
A natural question is how to reduce forking, and thereby increase
block throughput. To this end, we next introduce a blockchain
evolution protocol called Barracuda, that effectively reduces forking
without changing the system parameter ∆, which is determined by
network bandwidth.
4 ℓ-BARRACUDA
To reduce forking and increase block throughput, we propose ℓ-
Barracuda, which works as follows: upon arrival of a block (t , i), the
proposer of block (t , i) selects ℓ − 1 nodes in the network uniformly
at random, and inquires about their local tree.1 The proposer ag-
gregates the information from the ℓ − 1 other nodes and makes a
1We use the name Barracuda to refer to the general principle, and ℓ-Barracuda to refer
to an instantiation with polling parameter ℓ.
Barracuda: The Power of ℓ-polling in Proof-of-Stake Blockchains Mobihoc ’19, July 2–5, 2019, Catania, Italy
decision onwhere to attach block (t , i) based on the local attachment
protocol it follows. One key observation is that there is no conflict
between the local trees of each node, so the Barracuda strategy
simply merges totally ℓ local trees into a single tree with union of
all the edges in the local trees that are polled. Note that we poll
ℓ − 1 nodes, such that a total ℓ local trees are contributing, as the
proposers own local tree also contributes to the union.
We assume that when Barracuda polling happens, the polling
requests arrive at the polled nodes instantaneously, and it takes the
proposer node time ∆˜ to make the decision on where to attach the
block. The instantaneous polling assumption is relaxed in Section
5. Recall that in our model, ∆ accounts for both network delay and
processing delays. In live blockchain P2P networks, a substantial
fraction of block propagation delays originate from the processing
(e.g. validity checks) done by each node before relaying the block.
These delays could grow more pronounced for blockchains with
more complex processing requirements, such as smart contracts.
Since these computational checks are not included in the polling
process, the polling delay can be much smaller than the overall
network propagation delay. To simplify the analysis, we also assume
that each node processes the additional polled information in real
time, but does not store the polled information. In other words,
the information a node obtains from polling at time t is forgotten
at time t ′ > t + ∆˜. This modeling choice is made to simplify the
analysis; it results in a lower bound on the improvements due to
polling since nodes are discarding information. In practice, network
delay affects polling communication as well, and we investigate
experimentally these effects in Section 5.1.
To investigate the effect of polling on the blockchain, we define
appropriate events on the probabilistic model of block arrival and
block tree growth. We denote X ∼ Exp(λ) an exponential random
variable with probability density function pX (t) = λe−λt1(t ≥ 0),
and define set [m] ≜ {1, 2, . . . ,m} for any integer m ≥ 1. For a
message
Mj,i = (Block (j, i), point to the parent block of (j, i)),
denote its arrival time to nodem as R(j,i),m . Ifm is the proposer of
block (j, i), then R(j,i),m = γ (j)+ ∆˜. Ifm is not the proposer of block
(j, i), then R(j,i),m = γ (j)+ ∆˜+B(j,i),m , where B(j,i),m ∼ Exp(1/∆).
It follows from our assumptions that the random variables B(j,i),m
are mutually independent for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
We also denote the proposer of block (j, i) asm(j,i). To denote polled
nodes, we also writem(j,i) asm
(1)
(j,i), and denote the other ℓ−1 nodes
polled by nodem(j,i) asm
(2)
(j,i),m
(3)
(j,i), . . . ,m
(ℓ)
(j,i).
When block (j, i) is being proposed, we define the following
random variables. Let random variable
ej,i,l,r =

1 if by the time (j, i) was proposed, node
m
(l )
(j,i) already received block r
0 otherwise
(3)
Here j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [ℓ], r ∈ {(a,b) : a ∈ [j − 1],b ∈ [k]}. For
any r = (a,b), we denote r [1] = a, r [2] = b.
Since we will aggregate the information from the total ℓ nodes
whenever a proposer proposes, we also define ej,i,r = 1−∏ℓl=1(1−
ej,i,l,r ) as the event that when (j, i)was proposed, at least one node
m
(l )
(j,i) has received block r . The crucial observation is that when
the proposer tries to propose block (j, i), the complete information
it utilizes for decision is the collection of random variables
{ej,i,r : r [1] ∈ [j − 1], r [2] ∈ [k]}. (4)
The global tree at time γ (t) + ∆˜, denoted as Gt , is a tree consist-
ing of kt + 1 blocks including the Genesis block. We are interested
in the distribution of the global tree Gt . To illustrate how to com-
pute the probability of a certain tree structure, we demonstrate the
computation through an example where k = 1, t = 3, and ℓ = 1.
Figure 2: Examples of G3 with varying structures.
For simplicity, we denote ej,i,(r [1],r [2]) as ej,r [1] since for this
example k = 1. The probability of some of the configurations of G3
in Figure 2a can be written as
P [G3 = Figure 2a] = P
(
e2,1 = 1, e3,1 = 1, e3,2 = 1
)
,
P [G3 = Figure 2b] = P
(
e2,1 = 1, e3,1 = 1, e3,2 = 0
)
, and
P [G3 = Figure 2c] = P
(
e2,1 = 1, e3,1 = 0
)
.
Note that for the event in Figure 2, it does not matter whether node
m(3,1) has received block (2, 1) or not, as the parent of that block is
missing inm(3,1)’s local tree. Block (2, 1) is therefore not included
in the local tree of nodem(3,1) at that point in time.
4.1 Main result
Under any local attachment protocol C and any block arrival dis-
tribution, the event that EC,t,д = {Gt = д} depends on the ran-
dom choices of proposers and polled nodes, {m(l )(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈
[k], l ∈ [ℓ]}, and the messages received at those respective nodes,
{ej,i,r : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], r [1] ∈ [j − 1], r [2] ∈ [k]}, and some ad-
ditional outside randomness on the network delay and the block
arrival time. The following theorem characterizes the distribution
of Gt on the system parameters t ,∆, ℓ, ∆˜ for a general local attach-
ment protocol C (including the longest chain protocol). We provide
a proof in Section 6.2.
Theorem 4. For any local attachment protocol C and any inter-
block arrival distribution, define random variable G˜t which takes
values in the set of all possible structures of tree Gt such that 2
P(G˜t = д) ≜
E
[
1(EC,t,д)
{m(l )(j,i)} j ∈[t ],i ∈[k ],l ∈[ℓ] are distinct] . (5)
We have the following results:
2The random variable G˜t is well defined, since the protocol C is assumed not to
depend the identity of the proposer of each block. Hence, the conditional expectation
is identical conditioned on each specific {m(l )(j,i ) : j ∈ [t ], i ∈ [k ], l ∈ [ℓ]} whenever
all tkℓ nodes in it are distinct.
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(a) There exists a function F independent of all the parameters in
the model such that for any possible tree structure д,
P(G˜t = д) = F
( ∆
ℓ
, ∆˜,д,C
)
. (6)
(b) The total variation distance between the distribution ofGt and
G˜t is upper bounded:
TV
(
PGt , PG˜t
) ≤ (ℓkt)22n . (7)
In the definition in Eq. (5), we condition on the event that all
proposers and polled nodes are distinct. This conditioning ensures
that all received blocks ej,i,l,r ’s at those nodes are independent
over time j . This in turn allows us to capture the precise effect of ℓ
in the main result in Eq. (6). Further, the bound in Eq. (7) implies
that such conditioning is not too far from the actual evolution of
the blockchains, as long as the number of nodes are large enough:
n ≫ (ℓkt)2. While this condition may seem restrictive since t →∞,
notice that in practice, many blockchains operate in epochs of finite
duration, such that the state of the blockchain is finalized between
epochs [5, 17]. Finalization means that the system chooses a single
fork, and builds on the last block of that fork in the subsequent
epoch. Hence, the above condition can be physically met with finite
n. Moreover, in practice, n need not be so large, as we show in
Figure 3. Even with n = 10, 000 < (ℓkt)2 = 160, 000 for 4-polling,
the experiments support the predictions of Theorem 4.
The main message of the above theorem is that ℓ-Barracuda ef-
fectively reduces the network delay by a factor of ℓ. For any local
attachment protocol and any block arrival process, up to a total
variation distance of (ℓkt)2/n, the distribution of the evolution of
the blocktree with ℓ-Barracuda is the same as the distribution of
the evolution of the blocktree with no polling, but with a network
that is ℓ times faster. We confirm this in numerical experiments
(plotted in Figure 3), for a choice of ∆˜ = 0, n = 10, 000, k = 1,
t = 100, γ (t) = t , and the longest chain fork choice rule. In the
inset we show the same results, but scaled the x-axis as ∆/ℓ. As
predicted by Theorem 4, the curves converge to a single curve, and
are indistinguishable from one another. We used the network model
from Section 2.2.
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Figure 3: Comparing the average block throughput for var-
ious choices of ℓ confirms the theoretical prediction that ℓ-
Barracuda effectively speeds up the network by a factor of ℓ;
all curves are indistinguishable when x-axis is scaled as ∆/ℓ
as shown in the inset.
Without polling, the throughput degrades quickly as the net-
work delay increases. This becomes critical as we try to scale up
PoS systems; blocks should be generated more frequently, pushing
network infrastructure to its limits. With polling, we can achieve
an effective speedup of the network without investing resources on
hardware upgrades. Note that in this figure, we are comparing the
average block throughput, which is the main property of interest.
We make this connection between the throughput and ℓ precise
in the following. Define LChain(Gt ) to be the length of the longest
chain in Gt excluding the Genesis block. Throughput is defined as
E[LChain(Gt )]/t . We have the following Corollary of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. There exists a function L(∆/ℓ, ∆˜,C) independent
of all the parameters in the model such thatE[LChain(Gt )] − E[L(∆ℓ , ∆˜,C) ]  ≤ t(ℓkt)22n . (8)
In other words, in the regime that n ≫ t3(kℓ)2, the expectation
of the length of the longest chain depends on the delay parameter ∆
and the polling parameter ℓ only through their ratio ∆/ℓ. Hence, the
block throughput enjoys the same polling gain, as the distribution
of the resulting block trees.
4.2 Connections to balls-in-bins example
In this section, we give a brief explanation of the balls-in-bins
problem and the power of two choices in load balancing. We then
make a concrete connection between the blockchain problem and
the power of ℓ-polling in information balancing.
In the classical balls-in-bins example, we have t balls and t bins,
and we sequentially throw each ball into a uniformly randomly
selected bin. Then, the maximum loaded bin has load (i.e. number
of balls in that bin) scaling as Θ (log t/log log t) [24]. The result of
power of two choices states that if every time we select ℓ (ℓ ≥ 2)
bins uniformly at random and throw the ball into the least loaded
bin, the maximum load enjoys an near-exponential reduction to
Θ (log log t/log ℓ) [24].
Our polling idea is inspired by this power of two choices in load
balancing. We make this connection gradually more concrete in the
following. First, consider the case when the underlying network
is extremely slow such that no broadcast of the blocks is received.
When there is no polling, each node is only aware of its local
blockchain consisting of only those blocks it generated. There is a
one-to-one correspondence to the balls-in-bins setting, as blocks
(balls) arriving at each node (bin) build up a load (local blockchain).
When there are t nodes and t blocks, then it trivially follows that
the length of the longest chain scales as Θ(log t/log log t), when
there is no polling.
Themain departure is that in blockchains, the goal is to maximize
the length of the longest chain (maximum load). This leads to the
following fundamental question in the balls-in-bins problem, which
has not been solved, to the best of our knowledge. If we throw the
ball into the most loaded bin among ℓ randomly chosen bins at
each step, how does the maximum load scale with t and ℓ? That
is, if one wanted to maximize the maximum load, leading to load
unbalancing, how much gain does the power of ℓ choices give? We
give a precise answer in the following.
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Theorem 5. Given t empty bins and t balls, we sequentially al-
locate balls to bins as follows. For each ball, we select uniformly at
random ℓ bins, and put the ball into the maximally-loaded bin among
the ℓ chosen ones. Then, the maximum load of the t bins after the
placement of all t balls is at most
C · ℓ · log tlog log t (9)
with probability at least 1 − 1t , where C > 0 is a universal constant.
We refer to a longer version of this paper [11] for a proof. This
shows that the gain of ℓ-polling in maximizing the maximum load
is linear in ℓ. Even though this is not as dramatic as the exponential
gain of the load balancing case, this gives a precise characterization
of the gain in the throughput of ℓ-Barracuda in blockchains when
∆ ≫ 1. This is under a slightly modified protocol where the polling
happens in a bidirectional manner, such that the local tree and the
newly appended block of the proposer are also sent to the polled
nodes.
For moderate to small ∆ regime, which is the operating regime
of real systems, blocktree evolution is connected to a generalization
of the balls-in-bins model. Now, it is as if the balls are copied and
broadcasted to all other bins over a communication network. This
is where the intuitive connection to balls-and-bins stops, as we
are storing the information in a specific data structure that we call
blocktrees. However, we borrow the terminology from ‘load bal-
ancing’, and refer to the effect of polling as ‘information balancing’,
even though load balancing refers tominimizing the maximum load,
whereas information balancing refers to maximizing the maximum
load (longest chain) by balancing the information throughout the
nodes using polling.
5 SYSTEM AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
We empirically verify the robustness of our proposed protocol under
various issues that might come up in a practical implementation
of ℓ-Barracuda. Our experiment consists of n nodes connected via
a network which emulates the end to end delay as an exponential
distribution; this model is inspired by the measurements of the
Bitcoin P2P network made in [8].
Each of the n nodes maintains a local blocktree which is a subset
of the global blocktree. We use a deterministic block arrival process
with γ (t) = t , i.e. we assume a unit block arrival time which is also
termed as an epoch in this section. This represents an upper bound
on block arrivals in real-world PoS systems, where blocks can only
arrive at fixed time intervals. At the start of arrival t , k proposers
are chosen at random and each of these proposers proposes a block.
When there is no polling, each proposer chooses themost eligible
block from its blocktree to be a parent to the block it is proposing,
based on the fork choice rule. In the case of ℓ-Barracuda, the pro-
poser sends a pull message to ℓ − 1 randomly chosen nodes, and
these nodes send their block tree back to the proposer. The pro-
poser receives the block trees from the polled nodes after a delay ∆˜,
and updates her local blocktree by taking the union of all received
blocktrees. The same fork choice rule is applied to decide the parent
to the newly generated block. In all experiments, Nakamoto longest
chain fork choice rule is used. Experiments are run for T = 100
time epochs on a network with n = 10, 000 nodes with k = 1.
5.1 Effect of polling delay
In reality, there is delay between initializing a poll request and
receiving the blocktree information. We expect polling delay to be
smaller than the delay of the P2P relay network because polling
communication is point-to-point rather than occurring through the
P2P relay network. To understand the effects of polling delay, we
ran simulations in which a proposer polls ℓ − 1 nodes at the time
of proposal, and each piece of polled information arrives after time
∆˜1, ∆˜2, .., ∆˜ℓ−1 ∼ Exp( 10.1∆ ). The proposer determines the pointer
of the new block when all polled messages are received.
Figure 5 shows the effect of such polling delay, as measured by
∆0.8(ℓ), the largest delay ∆ that achieves a block throughput of at
least 0.8 under ℓ-Barracuda. More precisely,
∆0.8(ℓ) = max
{
∆ : lim
t→∞
E [L(Gt )]
t
≥ 0.8
}
.
Under this model, polling more nodes means waiting for more
responses; the gains of polling hence saturate for large enough ℓ,
and there is an appropriate practical choice of ℓ that depends on
the interplay between the P2P network speed and the polling delay.
In practice, there is a strategy to get a large polling gain, even
with delays: the proposer polls a large number of nodes, but only
waits a fixed amount of time before making a decision. Under this
protocol, polling more nodes can only help; the only cost of polling
is the communication cost. The results of our experiments under
this protocol are illustrated in Figure 5 (‘poll delay fixed wait’ curve).
This implies a gap in our model, which does not fully account
for the practical cost of polling. In order to account for polling
costs, we make the model more realistic by assigning a small and
constant delay of 0.01∆ to set up a connection with a polling node,
and assume that the connection setup occurs sequentially for ℓ − 1
nodes. The proposer follows the same strategy as above: waiting
for a fixed amount of time before making the decision. We see that
under such model, there is a finite optimal ℓ as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 4: The polling gain continues for large ℓ even with a
more practical choice of a polling delay 0.25∆.
As practical polling delays might be larger than 0.1D, we com-
pare it to a more practical setting where polling delay is D/4 with
a threshold wait time of D/4 in Figure 4. With this larger delays,
the performance is still continuously increasing with ℓ, and still
provides 250% improvement at ℓ=10.
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Effects of polling delay
Figure 5: With a polling delay, the per-
formance saturates after ℓ = 6. However,
we can continuously harness polling
gain if the proposers propose a new
block after a fixed time without waiting
for all polling to arrive.
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Figure 6: We assume a polling delay of
Exp(1/(0.1∆)) but the proposer waits ex-
actly ∆˜ = 0.1∆ time before proposing.
When there is a setup delay ∝ ℓ, we see
an optimal ℓ, which depends on all sys-
tem parameters.
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Figure 7: Heterogeneous networks enjoy
the same polling gain as homogeneous
ones. Heterogeneous ℓ-Barracuda pro-
vides a speedup of the network by a fac-
tor of about ℓ, as shown in the inset
where the x-axis is scaled by ∆/ℓ.
5.2 Heterogeneous networks
The theoretical and experimental evidence of the benefits of ℓ-
Barracuda have so far been demonstrated in the context of a ho-
mogeneous network: all the nodes in the network have the same
bandwidth and processing speeds. Further, individual variation in
end-to-end delay due to network traffic is captured by statistically-
identical exponential random variables. In practice, heterogeneity is
natural: some nodes have stronger network capabilities. We model
this by clustering the nodes into h different groups based on av-
erage network speed. The speed of a connection is determined
by the speed of the slower node. We compare the performance
of ℓ-Barracuda with no polling (which has worse performance
and serves as a lower bound). We follow the following uniform
polling strategy: Let the delay ∆ of a node be a part of the set
D = {∆1,∆2, ..,∆h }; a node’s delay is defined as follows: the av-
erage delay of transmitting a block across the P2P network from
node with delay ∆i to a node with delay ∆j ismax(∆i ,∆j ) ∀i ∈ [h].
In Figure 7, we show the performance of a heterogeneous network
with h = 2: half of the nodes have delay ∆ and the others have
delay 5∆. Every node has the same proposer election probability.
ℓ-Barracuda gives a throughput increase in line Theorem 4.
5.3 Other practical issues
There are remaining three major practical issues. First, the polling
studied in this paper requires syncing of the complete local block-
tree, which is redundant and unnecessarily wastes network re-
sources. For efficient bandwidth usage, we propose (ℓ,b)-polling,
where the polled nodes only send the blocks that were generated
between times t − 1 and t − b. Secondly, to ensure timely response
from polled nodes, we propose appropriate incentive mechanism,
motivated by the reputation systems used in BitTorrent. Finally,
a fraction of the participants may deviate from the proposed pro-
tocol with explicit malicious intent (of causing harm to the key
performance metrics). It is natural to explore potential security
vulnerabilities exposed by the ℓ-Barracuda protocol proposed in
this paper. All these practical issues are expanded in detail with
numerical experiments to support them, in the longer version of
this paper available at [11].
6 PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
6.1 Proof of Theorem 3
We apply Theorem 4 with general ℓ ≥ 1 and then specialize it
to ℓ = 1 to obtain the theorem statement. Denote the chain as д,
and ej,i,r [1],r [2] as ej,r [1] since here k = 1. The event EC,t,д can be
written as
EC,t,д = 1(e2,1 = 1) · 1(e3,1 = 1, e3,2 = 1)·
. . . · 1(et,1 = 1, et,2 = 1, . . . , et,t−1 = 1). (10)
Let E˜ denote the event that every node has proposed or been
polled at most once. Conditioned on E˜, and defining α ≜ e ∆˜l/∆:
E[1(EC,t,д)|E˜] =
t∏
j=2
E[1(ej,1 = 1, ej,2 = 1, . . . , ej, j−1 = 1)|E˜]
=
t∏
j=2
j−1∏
m=1
(1 − e ∆˜l∆ e−mℓ∆ ) =
t−1∏
j=1
(1 − αe− jℓ∆ )t−j ≤ (1 − αe− ℓ∆ )t−1.
Wenow claim that if ℓ ≥ ∆(ln t−ln ln
1
δ )
1−∆˜ , we haveE[1(EC,t,д)|E˜] ≥
δ − o(1). Let c = ln 1δ . Indeed, in this case, we have αe−ℓ/∆ ≤
ln(1/δ )/t . Hence,
E[1(EC,t,д)|E˜] ≥
t−1∏
j=1
(
1 − c
j
t j
)t−j
=
(
1 − c
t
)t t−1t t−1∏
j=2
(
1 − c
j
t j
)t−j (a)≥ e−c − o(1) = δ − o(1),
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that limt→∞(1 −
c/t)t−1 = e−c . Conversely, we show that if ℓ ≤ ∆(ln t−ln ln
1
δ )
1−∆˜ , then
E[1(EC,t,д)|E˜] ≤ δ + o(1). Indeed, in this case we have αe−ℓ/∆ ≥
Barracuda: The Power of ℓ-polling in Proof-of-Stake Blockchains Mobihoc ’19, July 2–5, 2019, Catania, Italy
ln(1/δ )/t , and
E[1(EC,t,д)|E˜] ≤ (1 − c/t)t−1 = e−c + o(1) = δ + o(1).
Lemma 1. Let c > 0 be fixed. Then we have that limn→∞
∑n−1
k=2(n−
k) log(1 − ck/nk ) = 0.
The proof is included in the extended version [11]. Note that the
distribution of {m1,m2,m3, . . . ,mt } is independent of {Rt i : t ≥
1, i ∈ [n]}, hence we could condition on a specific realization of
{m2,m3, . . . ,mT } and compute the conditional expectation of the
event that leads to the final global tree as a chain. We claim:
Lemma 2. For any T ≥ 1, letting x = e−λ , we have ∏T−1j=1 (1 −
x j )T−j ≤ E[ET |{mi : 2 ≤ i ≤ T }] ≤ (1 − x)T−1.
The full proof is included in [11]. The upper bound uses the
independence of the propagation delays, whereas the lower bound
relies on the fact that all the T − 1 events in the T − 1 indicators
functions of ET are nonnegatively correlated.
Since Lemma 2 does not depend on the values of {mi }Ti=2, we
know that the bounds apply to E[ET ] as well. For the d-polling
strategy, it can be verified that both the upper and lower bound
computations in Lemma 2 are still valid, if we replace x with xd .
Indeed, for the upper bound, each block contributes at least d inde-
pendent random variables; for the lower bound, we can show that
the T − 1 events are positively correlated. Now we claim that in
order to ensure that E[ET ] ≥ δ , the required number of d is at least
approximately d ≥ lnT−ln ln
1
δ
λ for T large. Let c = ln
1
δ . We claim
that if x ≤ cT , then the probability lower bound is satisfied. Indeed,
in this case,
E[ET ] ≥
T−1∏
j=1
(
1 − c
j
T j
)T−j
=
(
1 − c
T
)T ·T−1T T−1∏
j=2
(
1 − c
j
T j
) T j
c j
c j (T−j )
T j
≥ e−c − o(1) = δ − o(1)
as T →∞. We also claim that if x > cT , then the probability lower
bound is asymptotically not satisfied. Indeed, in this case
E[ET ] ≤ (1 − x)T−1 <
(
1 − c
T
)T−1
= e−c + o(1) = δ + o(1)
as T → ∞. Hence, the threshold we aim for should be precisely
x = cT . Replacing it with e
−λd = ln
1
δ
T , we get d =
lnT−ln ln 1δ
λ .
6.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Part (1). One key observation is that, if every node has only been
polled or proposed at most once, i.e„ the set {m(l )(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈
[k], l ∈ [ℓ]} contains tkℓ distinct nodes, then conditioned on this
specific sequence {m(l )(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [ℓ]}, all the random
variables {ej,i,l,r : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [ℓ], r [1] ∈ [j − 1], r [2] ∈ [k]}
aremutually independent. Furthermore, conditioned on this specific
sequence, we have
E[ej,i,l,r |{m(l )(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [ℓ]}, {γ (i)}ti=1] (11)
= 1 − e−(γ (j)−γ (r [1])−∆˜)/∆ , (12)
for all r such that r [1] ∈ [j−1], r [2] ∈ [k]. Let E˜ denote the event that
{m(l )(j,i) : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [ℓ]} are distinct. It follows from the defi-
nition of local attachment protocol C that E[ej,i,l,r |E˜, , {γ (i)}ti=1] =
1 − e−(γ (j)−γ (r [1])−∆˜)/∆ for all r such that r [1] ∈ [j − 1], r [2] ∈ [k].
Note that the event EC,t,д = {Gt = д} only depends on {m(l )(j,i) :
j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], l ∈ [ℓ]} and {ej,i,r : j ∈ [t], i ∈ [k], r [1] ∈
[j − 1], r [2] ∈ [k]} plus some additional outside randomness. Since
ej,i,r = 1 ⇔ ∑l ∈[ℓ] ej,i,l,r ≥ 1, it follows from the independence
of ej,i,l,r and equation (11) that
E[ej,i,r |E˜, {γ (i)}ti=1] = 1 − e−(γ (j)−γ (r [1])−∆˜)ℓ/∆ (13)
all r such that r [1] ∈ [j − 1], r [2] ∈ [k]. Hence, we have
P(G˜t = д) = E
[
1(EC,t,д)|E˜, {γ (i)}ti=1
]
= F ({γ (i)}ti=1,
∆
ℓ
, ∆˜,д,C).
Now we show the second part of Theorem 4. Denote by A =
{д1,д2, . . . ,дA} any collection of distinct tree structures that Gt
may take values in. Then, we have
P(Gt ∈ A|{γ (i)}ti=1) = E
[ A∑
i=1
1(EC,t,дi )
{γ (i)}ti=1
]
(14)
= P(G˜t ∈ A) + (1 − P(E˜ |{γ (i)}ti=1))
×
(
E[
A∑
i=1
1(EC,t,дi )|E˜c , {γ (i)}ti=1] − E[
A∑
i=1
1(EC,t,дi )|E˜, {γ (i)}ti=1]
)
.
(15)
It follows from the birthday paradox compution [24, Pg. 92] that
1−P(E˜ |{γ (i)}ti=1) ≤ ktℓ(ktℓ − 1)/2n. Hence, we have shown that for
any measurable setA thatGt or G˜t take values in, we have |P(Gt ∈
A|{γ (i)}ti=1) − P(G˜t ∈ A)| ≤ 1 − P(E˜ |{γ (i)}ti=1) ≤ kt ℓ(kt ℓ−1)2n . The
result follows from the definition of the total variation distance
TV(PGt | {γ (i)}ti=1 , PG˜t ) = supA |P(Gt ∈ A|{γ (i)}
t
i=1) − P(G˜t ∈ A)|.
Part (2).Wenote that there exists some functionL({γ (i)}ti=1, ∆ℓ , ∆˜,C)
independent of all the parameters in the model such that the expec-
tation of the longest chain of G˜t is equal to L({γ (i)}ti=1, ∆ℓ , ∆˜,C). To
obtain the final result, it suffices to use the variational representa-
tion of total variation distance, TV(P ,Q) = supf : |f | ≤ 12 EP f − EQ f ,
and taking f = 1t · (LChain(Gt ) − t/2), upon noticing that the length
of the longest chain in the tree Gt is at most t .
7 RELATEDWORK
Four main approaches exist for reducing forking.
(1) Reducing proposer diversity. A natural approach is to make the
same node propose consecutive blocks; for instance, Bitcoin-NG
[9] proposers use the longest-chain fork choice rule, but within
a given time epoch, only a single proposer can propose blocks.
This allows the proposer to quickly produce blocks without forking
effects. Although Bitcoin-NG has high throughput, it exhibits a few
problems. When a single node is in charge of block proposal for an
extended period of time, attackers may be able to learn that node’s
IP address and take it down. The idea of fixing the proposer is also
used in other protocols, such as Thunderella [27] and ByzCoin [18].
(2) Embracing forking. Other protocols use forking to contribute
to throughput. Examples include GHOST [31], PHANTOM [30],
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SPECTRE [29], and Inclusive/Conflux [20, 21]. GHOST describes
a fork choice rule that tolerates honest forking by building on
the heaviest subtree of the blocktree. SPECTRE, PHANTOM, and
Conflux instead use existing fork choice rules, but build a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) over the produced blocks to define a transac-
tion ordering. A formal understanding of such DAG-based protocols
is evolving; their security properties are not yet well-understood.
(3) Structured DAGs. A related approach is to allow structured
forking. The Prism consensus mechanism explicitly co-designs a
consensus protocol and fork choice rule to securely deal with con-
current blocks, thereby achieving optimal throughput and latency
[2]. The key intuition is to run many concurrent blocktrees, where
a single proposer tree is in charge of ordering transactions, and
the remaining voter trees are in charge of confirming blocks in the
proposer tree. Barracuda is designed to be integrated into existing
consensus protocols, whereas [2] is a new consensus protocol.
(4) Fork-free consensus. Consensus protocols like Algorand [14],
Ripple, and Stellar [22] prevent forking entirely by conducting a full
round of consensus for every block. Although voting-based consen-
sus protocols consume additional time for each block, they may im-
prove overall efficiency by removing the need to resolve forks later;
this hypothesis remains untested. A challenge in such protocols
is that BFT voting protocols can be communication-intensive, and
require a known set of participants. Although some work addresses
these challenges [18, 26], many industrial blockchain systems run-
ning on BFT voting protocols require some centralization.
Our approach can be viewed as a partial execution of a polling-
based consensus protocol. Polling has long been used in consensus
protocols [1, 7, 12, 28]. Our approach differs in part because we
do not use polling to reach complete consensus, but to reduce the
number of inputs to a (separate) consensus protocol.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose ℓ-polling as a technique for improving
block throughput in proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies. We show that
for small ℓ, ℓ-polling has the same effect on block throughput as if
the mean network delay were reduced by a factor of ℓ. This simple,
lightweight method improves throughput without substantially
altering either the underlying consensus protocol or the network.
Several open questions remain, particularly with regards to ana-
lyzing adversarial behavior in ℓ-polling. We have avoided them
in this paper by proposing a symmetric version of the protocol
(cf. Section 5.3), but even within the original ℓ-polling protocol, it
is unclear how much an adversary could affect block throughput
and/or chain quality by responding untruthfully to poll requests.
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